I need to say that this posting should not be used as legal advice. This question was posed to my class as part of a college course. The response is my fault.
In Chicago Fire Fighters IAFF Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 717 F Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ill, 1989), fire station locker searches were upheld as constitutional because the firefighters did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their lockers. What if the fire department did not inform the firefighters - through discussion with the union and issuance of general orders - that the locker searches would be conducted? Would the case come out the same way?
When considering the admissibility of the cooler of beer found during a search of the fire fighters in-station locker, the question arises whether the fire officials from the City of Chicago Fire Department were required to obtain a search warrant before the search of the locker was conducted. This action raises several issues that must be considered. 1) seach and seizure law regarding warrant requirements and reasonable expectional of privacy of public employees in their place of work.
Existing Laws
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Constitution)
The Fourth Amendment applies to the actions of the federal government and federal employees. The states, counties, and municipalities were included in the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment by virture of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. (U.S. Constitution)
In O’Connor v. Ortega (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court found that public employees do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their work are noting “Regardless of any expectation of privacy in the office itself, the undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets” (para.1). Yet the Court differetiates as to who condcts the search in stating “However, the operational realities of the workplace may make some public employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor, rather than a law enforcement official” (para 1).
The U.S. Supreme Court upholds workplace searches that in Shields v Burge (1984), stating that “A workplace search to investigate work-related misconduct ordinarily is ‘justified at its inception’ if reasonable grounds exist to suspect that the search will turn up evidence of the employee's misconduct” (Sect.1, para.6). Further the U.S. Supreme Court considered in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn. (1989), that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct of employees whose job is considered safety-sensitive when “That interest presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements” (Sect. 2, para. a)
The final case having bearing on the issue of workplace searches without a warrant in highly regulated businesses is New York v. Burger (1987) The U.S. Supreme Court found that “[a written policy] provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” (Sect. 2, para. b)
Analysis
The Chicago firefighters contend that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated believing that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace, more specifically their lockers The reasoned that since they is a reasonable expectation of privacy in desks and file cabinets, as in O’Connor, private securable areas such as lockers should be protected as well.
The U.S. Court of Appeals indicated that the Chicago Fire Department acted within it’s legal rights in conducting the lockers inspections. The fire department had conducted the inspections after “complaints from neighbors of the firehouse and subsequent surveillance operation which lead CFD officials to reasonably suspect that alcohol and/or drug use or possession…was occuring [at the firehouse]” (Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 1989). Thus, the Chicago Fire Department’s inspection would be permissable as the firefighters would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as the situation closely resembled Shields wherein the department beleived that employee misconduct was occuring.
The Skinner Court further supported the Chicago Fire Department officials’ decision to conduct the locker inspections in that it provided the fire department’s “interest presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements” (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 1989).
The firefighters whose lockers were searched were previously advised by Chicago Fire Department General Order 85-007 that all lockers in the fire stations were subject to periodic inspection. Thus there was a written polic in effect as noted in Burger (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court found that in a closely regulated industry if a written policy was in place that inspections could be conducted without a warrant.
Conclusion
The Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local 2 claimed that evidence found in a seach of the in station lockers of assigned to fire fighters was a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The U.S. Court of Appeals decided that in order of the City of Chicago Fire Department to conduct locker searches without a warrant, it must have a reasonable suspicion that misconduct was occuring at the firehouse and a written policy advising the employees that they had no reasonable expectation of privacy their work space, including lockers. As stated previously, there was a reasonable suspicion of firefighter misconduct based upon tips indicating use of alcohol and drug use and possession at the firehouse and there was a written policy in effect. The City of Chicago Fire Department did not violate the rights of the individual firefighters and the evidence seized during that locker search was admissable as evidence.
However, if the City of Chicago Fire Department had not had General Order 85-007 and had they not made assurances that each individual employed by the department had first hand knowledge of the terms and expectations of the Order, the result of the case may have been different.
In Burger, the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that no warrant is needed if there is a written policy. Thus, in the absence of a written policy regarding locker searches, a warrant would be needed.
Friday, November 5, 2010
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Alarms and responsibility
Who's guilty of doing this raise your hands (mine is up)!!
Chief seeks investigation of Tampa firefighters' response to alarm
Copyright 2003 Times Publishing Company
St. Petersburg Times (Florida)
July 10, 2003 Thursday 2 Late Tampa Edition
A red hydrant sits outside Building 7 at Camden Bayside apartments on West Shore Boulevard, but firefighters didn't use it Tuesday at 6:45 p.m. when responding to a fire alarm. Instead, they left. An hour later, three apartments were on fire. Now, Tampa Fire Rescue Chief Aria Green is calling for an investigation. He wants to know why the captain of Engine 19 didn't check the fire alarm. "We have to determine if his actions were appropriate or not," Green said Wednesday. "At first blush, I would think that they were not appropriate."
Firefighters are supposed to get out of the truck when checking an alarm. It is believed these firefighters did not. They are supposed to check out the alarm panel, Green said, and "Try to find out what is causing the system to go into alarm." They are also supposed to talk to residents and see if they smell smoke. The officer in charge of Engine 19, whose name is not being released, could face disciplinary action, Green said. But he might not be totally at fault. Residents say that when Engine 19 arrived on scene, Camden maintenance worker Joe Hailey told them everything was under control. The firefighters left shortly afterwards, they said.
When reached at Camden's leasing office Wednesday, Hailey declined comment. Green said he is researching the maintenance worker's involvement, but said Engine 19's personnel still should have checked out the alarm. He said the investigation should be finished by Friday. The fire likely started with a loud lightning clap around 6:45 p.m. Tuesday. Carli Segelson, 26, was in her third floor apartment at Camden Bayside, 6301 S West Shore Boulevard, with her friend and next door neighbor, Elizabeth Malm, 24. Segelson was trying on a suit she bought at Ann Taylor. A studio operator at WTSP Ch. 10, she wants someday to be a reporter and was working on a studio tape. Then, she became news.
After the loud clap, the lights went off in her bedroom. She flipped a switch in the fuse box "and it was fine, or so we thought," she said. Instantly, she smelled smoke and sulfur, she said. Her friend Malm went outside in the rain with an umbrella. "We wanted to know if we should call the fire department," said Malm. But Engine 19, responding to an automatic fire alarm, was already there. So were several residents and Hailey, the maintenance worker. He showed the residents a light in the stairwell, which was charred and black, and told Segelson and Malm that the light blew and that's why they smelled smoke. The women saw Hailey talking to firefighters and then the residents saw the firefighters drive off. "From what we saw, they never got off the truck," said Malm. Segelson, who said she still smelled smoke, went back to her apartment. Twenty minutes later, "I heard a crackling sound." She went outside and looked up "and I could see flames going all across." She knocked on her neighbor's door. "The building's on fire," she said. "We need to get out of here."
Segelson called 911. This time, Engine 15 came out within seven minutes, at 7:40 p.m. "They were awesome," she said. "They helped us out a lot." Damage is estimated at $200,000, most occurring to Segelson's living room and kitchen and the roof of Building 7. Two lower level apartments had water damage. About half a dozen residents spent the night at a hotel Tuesday. "It is disturbing that firefighters didn't check out anything the first time," said Segelson, standing among the rubble in her apartment Wednesday. "The whole thing could have been prevented." Carli Segelson, 26, takes stock of fire damage in her apartment at Camden Bayside in South Tampa. Bob Tucker of Belfor U.S.A. sweeps up. Firefighters' response to could lead to an inquiry.
Chief seeks investigation of Tampa firefighters' response to alarm
Copyright 2003 Times Publishing Company
St. Petersburg Times (Florida)
July 10, 2003 Thursday 2 Late Tampa Edition
A red hydrant sits outside Building 7 at Camden Bayside apartments on West Shore Boulevard, but firefighters didn't use it Tuesday at 6:45 p.m. when responding to a fire alarm. Instead, they left. An hour later, three apartments were on fire. Now, Tampa Fire Rescue Chief Aria Green is calling for an investigation. He wants to know why the captain of Engine 19 didn't check the fire alarm. "We have to determine if his actions were appropriate or not," Green said Wednesday. "At first blush, I would think that they were not appropriate."
Firefighters are supposed to get out of the truck when checking an alarm. It is believed these firefighters did not. They are supposed to check out the alarm panel, Green said, and "Try to find out what is causing the system to go into alarm." They are also supposed to talk to residents and see if they smell smoke. The officer in charge of Engine 19, whose name is not being released, could face disciplinary action, Green said. But he might not be totally at fault. Residents say that when Engine 19 arrived on scene, Camden maintenance worker Joe Hailey told them everything was under control. The firefighters left shortly afterwards, they said.
When reached at Camden's leasing office Wednesday, Hailey declined comment. Green said he is researching the maintenance worker's involvement, but said Engine 19's personnel still should have checked out the alarm. He said the investigation should be finished by Friday. The fire likely started with a loud lightning clap around 6:45 p.m. Tuesday. Carli Segelson, 26, was in her third floor apartment at Camden Bayside, 6301 S West Shore Boulevard, with her friend and next door neighbor, Elizabeth Malm, 24. Segelson was trying on a suit she bought at Ann Taylor. A studio operator at WTSP Ch. 10, she wants someday to be a reporter and was working on a studio tape. Then, she became news.
After the loud clap, the lights went off in her bedroom. She flipped a switch in the fuse box "and it was fine, or so we thought," she said. Instantly, she smelled smoke and sulfur, she said. Her friend Malm went outside in the rain with an umbrella. "We wanted to know if we should call the fire department," said Malm. But Engine 19, responding to an automatic fire alarm, was already there. So were several residents and Hailey, the maintenance worker. He showed the residents a light in the stairwell, which was charred and black, and told Segelson and Malm that the light blew and that's why they smelled smoke. The women saw Hailey talking to firefighters and then the residents saw the firefighters drive off. "From what we saw, they never got off the truck," said Malm. Segelson, who said she still smelled smoke, went back to her apartment. Twenty minutes later, "I heard a crackling sound." She went outside and looked up "and I could see flames going all across." She knocked on her neighbor's door. "The building's on fire," she said. "We need to get out of here."
Segelson called 911. This time, Engine 15 came out within seven minutes, at 7:40 p.m. "They were awesome," she said. "They helped us out a lot." Damage is estimated at $200,000, most occurring to Segelson's living room and kitchen and the roof of Building 7. Two lower level apartments had water damage. About half a dozen residents spent the night at a hotel Tuesday. "It is disturbing that firefighters didn't check out anything the first time," said Segelson, standing among the rubble in her apartment Wednesday. "The whole thing could have been prevented." Carli Segelson, 26, takes stock of fire damage in her apartment at Camden Bayside in South Tampa. Bob Tucker of Belfor U.S.A. sweeps up. Firefighters' response to could lead to an inquiry.
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Hey there everyone, I'm sorry that I haven't posted in a while, but I've been pretty busy taking some college courses. I've definetly been doing a lot of writiing. My free time is pretty limited. At the request of some of my fire buddies, I'm going to post some of my college papers as posts. This might be interesting to some of you, as most are about fire department related stuff.
Heres an article/paper about the Human Body and Smoke inhalation:
The Human Body’s Response to Fire Gases, Heat, and Visible Smoke
There are many toxic gases which are produced as a byproduct of combustion. The toxic gas cocktail that is produced is dependent on the fuel being burned. Historically, structures were built using some combination of wood, masonry, and steel. After World War II, new manufacturing processes enabled the plastic industry to mold and form plastics into building materials. (Packaging Today, n.d.) The construction industry embraced these new materials because they were lighter, in some cases stronger, and had a more consistent dimensions and stability. However a significant problem with plastics is that when on fire, they produce a greater number of toxic gases and thicker smoke than traditional construction materials. Plastics combined with the high heat output of traditional construction materials produce modern fires which are more deadly because of their higher heat, their toxic gases, and their reduced visibility. This paper will analyze the effects of a modern structure fire on the human body.
In his work on fire gas production, Dr. Vytenis Babrauskas identified 20 lethal gases that, dependant on the fuel package, could be encountered as byproducts of a structure fire. Further he notes that “carbon monoxide accounts for about ½ of fire toxicity problem” (Babrauskas, 1997). In addition to the abundance of carbon monoxide during structure fires, highly toxic phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, sulfur dioxide, and acrolein are all present. Each of these is considered lethal in exposures of less than 1000 parts per million to victims exposed for 5 minutes or more. The human body can be attacked by these toxic gases through means of asphyxiation, pulmonary irritation, and toxicity. oxygen or an increase of carbon monoxide in the blood” (Webster's Dictionary, 1996). The propensity of carbon monoxide, which is an asphyxiant, to attach itself to the hemoglobin of the red bloods cells is 250 times more than that of oxygen. In doing so, the red blood cells cannot carry oxygen to the body, thus causing the victim to become hypoxic. Depending on the degree and duration of the exposure to carbon monoxide, the victim’s respiratory system can no longer supply the victim’s body with enough oxygen for normal functioning and will slip into unconsciousness and eventually death through asphyxiation.
In the 20th edition of the Fire Protection Handbook, Richard Gann and Nelson Bryner (2008) outline the two primary types of irritants: sensory and pulmonary (p. 6-16). Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is widely used in modern construction as plumbing piping, electrical conduit, accent trim, and vinyl siding. One byproduct of fires involving PVC products is halogen chloride. Halogen chloride is a both a strong sensory irritant in addition to being a pulmonary irritant. Sensory irritants attack the eyes and upper respiratory airway. The body’s reaction to the pain in the eyes includes tear production and involuntary eye blinking. The irritation to the upper respiratory tract causes the mucus membranes in the throat and nasal passages to create excessive mucus to remove the irritant from the body. This flushing of the excess mucus causes involuntary coughing in the victim.
Asphxiants and irritants are the most prevalent types of toxicants found in fires. However, other toxicants can be found in fire gasses. The type and number of these toxicants is dependent on the type of fuel being burned. The breakdown of the fuel and the chemical changes associated with it create an endless possibility of toxicants. Because of the unlimited number of toxicants possible and significant variables presented by changes in exposure time, there is limited data available regarding the effect on human body’s reaction to toxicants. Most information regarding toxicity is extrapolated from lethality and incapacitation times in testing with rats. Using toxic gas models, the lethal quantities necessary for fatality or incapacitation in rats are multiplied by varying numeric factors to estimate effects on humans (Gann & Bryner, 2008).
In addition to toxicity, another byproduct of a modern structure fire is heat. According to Gann and Bryner (2008), “Heat produced from a fire present significant physical danger to humans in three basic ways: burns to the skin, hyperthermia or heat stroke, and respiratory tract burns” (p.6-26). In a fire event, the primary means of heat energy transfer to the victim is radiant heat. Radiant heat energy can cause damage to the body if the intensity and duration exceeds the body’s natural cooling defenses. According to Gann and Bryner, the human body’s “tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat is approximately 2.5kW/m2, below which exposure can be tolerated for 30 minutes or longer without significant consequences” (p.6-26).
Another important means of heat transfer is convective heat energy. Convective heat energy attacks the human body by exposure to superheated gases. The body’s natural defenses are unable to cool itself and the victim suffers environmentally induced hyperthermia. During hyperthermia, the body’s natural cooling mechanisms of perspiration and blood flow continue to attempt to self regulate the body’s temperature. However, when the body reaches 106°F, the body’s self regulation system shuts down, causing heat stroke which is a critical medical emergency (Helman & Habal, 2009). In order to combat heat stroke, the body must be rapidly cooled by external means before permanent damage and/or death occur
Burns to the respiratory tract occur when a victim inhales superheated toxic fire gases, thus causing injury and toxic exposure to the victim’s lungs. Through the process of normal inhalation and exhalation, the alveoli remove carbon dioxide from the blood and replace it with oxygen to be carried thoughout the body. In their work on smoke inhalation, Keith Lafferty and Harry Goett noted “Inhalation injury from smoke and the noxious products of combustion in fires may account for as many as 60-80% of fire-related deaths in the United States” (Lafftery & Goett, 2010). The body’s natural defense systems fight to protect the injured organs of the respiratory tract. Often fluid accumulation, in the form of swelling of the lungs, further complicates the transfer of oxygen to the already injured alveoli. This process interferes with the victim’s ability to breathe.
The skin is the largest organ of the body and is a primary means of defense from external attack. All three types of heat energy transfer attack the skin’s surface. Depending on the intensity and duration of the exposure, skin may be damaged by: first degree burns which involve only the outer layer of skin and cause pain, redness, and swelling; second degree burns which involve both outer and underlying skin and blistering; third degree burns which extend into the deeper layers of tissues and they additionally present white or blackened skin that may be numb (Penn Medicine, 2010).
While conductive heat energy transfer in a live victim is possible, the duration of extended exposure to a direct flame is rare. In large scale exposures, such as an explosion or ignition of an engulfing fire, the victim may or may not be able to escape before being overcome. On small scale exposures, victims instinctively move their entire body or the exposed portion of the body away from the heat source.
Visible smoke is an airborne accumulation of particulate carbon and other products produced by incomplete combustion. The thickness of the smoke is highly dependent on the fuel being burned, the efficiency of the fire in consuming the fuel, and the ventilation characteristics of the fire compartment. Gann and Bryner (2008), state that “[o]bscuration of vision due to smoke is related to its concentration and is usually expressed as optical density per meter” (p. 6-27). As this optical density increases one’s ability to see clearly decreases. As such, the human eye incrementally loses the ability to clearly identify light signals and the ability to differentiate contrasting colors, such as exit signs and corridors, becomes compromised.
References
Babrauskas, V. (1997). Toxicity for the primary gases found in fires. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://www.doctorfire.com/toxicity.html
Gann, R., & Bryner, N. (2008). Combustion products and their safety effects on life safety. In A. E. Cote, Fire Protection Handbook 20th ed. Section 6. (p. 6.16). Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association.
Helman, R. S., & Habal, R. (2009, September 18). Heat Stroke. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/166320-overview
Lafftery, K., & Goett, H. (2010, June 30). Smoke Inhalation. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/771194-overview
Packaging Today. (n.d.). A Plastics Explosion - Polyethylene, Polypropylene, and Others. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://www.packagingtoday.com
Penn Medicine. (2010, January 13). Burns. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from http://www.pennmedicine.org/encyclopedia/em_DisplayArticle.aspx?gcid=000030&ptid=1
Webster's Dictionary. (1996). Webster's Newly Revised Dictionary. Boston New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Heres an article/paper about the Human Body and Smoke inhalation:
The Human Body’s Response to Fire Gases, Heat, and Visible Smoke
There are many toxic gases which are produced as a byproduct of combustion. The toxic gas cocktail that is produced is dependent on the fuel being burned. Historically, structures were built using some combination of wood, masonry, and steel. After World War II, new manufacturing processes enabled the plastic industry to mold and form plastics into building materials. (Packaging Today, n.d.) The construction industry embraced these new materials because they were lighter, in some cases stronger, and had a more consistent dimensions and stability. However a significant problem with plastics is that when on fire, they produce a greater number of toxic gases and thicker smoke than traditional construction materials. Plastics combined with the high heat output of traditional construction materials produce modern fires which are more deadly because of their higher heat, their toxic gases, and their reduced visibility. This paper will analyze the effects of a modern structure fire on the human body.
In his work on fire gas production, Dr. Vytenis Babrauskas identified 20 lethal gases that, dependant on the fuel package, could be encountered as byproducts of a structure fire. Further he notes that “carbon monoxide accounts for about ½ of fire toxicity problem” (Babrauskas, 1997). In addition to the abundance of carbon monoxide during structure fires, highly toxic phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, sulfur dioxide, and acrolein are all present. Each of these is considered lethal in exposures of less than 1000 parts per million to victims exposed for 5 minutes or more. The human body can be attacked by these toxic gases through means of asphyxiation, pulmonary irritation, and toxicity. oxygen or an increase of carbon monoxide in the blood” (Webster's Dictionary, 1996). The propensity of carbon monoxide, which is an asphyxiant, to attach itself to the hemoglobin of the red bloods cells is 250 times more than that of oxygen. In doing so, the red blood cells cannot carry oxygen to the body, thus causing the victim to become hypoxic. Depending on the degree and duration of the exposure to carbon monoxide, the victim’s respiratory system can no longer supply the victim’s body with enough oxygen for normal functioning and will slip into unconsciousness and eventually death through asphyxiation.
In the 20th edition of the Fire Protection Handbook, Richard Gann and Nelson Bryner (2008) outline the two primary types of irritants: sensory and pulmonary (p. 6-16). Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is widely used in modern construction as plumbing piping, electrical conduit, accent trim, and vinyl siding. One byproduct of fires involving PVC products is halogen chloride. Halogen chloride is a both a strong sensory irritant in addition to being a pulmonary irritant. Sensory irritants attack the eyes and upper respiratory airway. The body’s reaction to the pain in the eyes includes tear production and involuntary eye blinking. The irritation to the upper respiratory tract causes the mucus membranes in the throat and nasal passages to create excessive mucus to remove the irritant from the body. This flushing of the excess mucus causes involuntary coughing in the victim.
Asphxiants and irritants are the most prevalent types of toxicants found in fires. However, other toxicants can be found in fire gasses. The type and number of these toxicants is dependent on the type of fuel being burned. The breakdown of the fuel and the chemical changes associated with it create an endless possibility of toxicants. Because of the unlimited number of toxicants possible and significant variables presented by changes in exposure time, there is limited data available regarding the effect on human body’s reaction to toxicants. Most information regarding toxicity is extrapolated from lethality and incapacitation times in testing with rats. Using toxic gas models, the lethal quantities necessary for fatality or incapacitation in rats are multiplied by varying numeric factors to estimate effects on humans (Gann & Bryner, 2008).
In addition to toxicity, another byproduct of a modern structure fire is heat. According to Gann and Bryner (2008), “Heat produced from a fire present significant physical danger to humans in three basic ways: burns to the skin, hyperthermia or heat stroke, and respiratory tract burns” (p.6-26). In a fire event, the primary means of heat energy transfer to the victim is radiant heat. Radiant heat energy can cause damage to the body if the intensity and duration exceeds the body’s natural cooling defenses. According to Gann and Bryner, the human body’s “tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat is approximately 2.5kW/m2, below which exposure can be tolerated for 30 minutes or longer without significant consequences” (p.6-26).
Another important means of heat transfer is convective heat energy. Convective heat energy attacks the human body by exposure to superheated gases. The body’s natural defenses are unable to cool itself and the victim suffers environmentally induced hyperthermia. During hyperthermia, the body’s natural cooling mechanisms of perspiration and blood flow continue to attempt to self regulate the body’s temperature. However, when the body reaches 106°F, the body’s self regulation system shuts down, causing heat stroke which is a critical medical emergency (Helman & Habal, 2009). In order to combat heat stroke, the body must be rapidly cooled by external means before permanent damage and/or death occur
Burns to the respiratory tract occur when a victim inhales superheated toxic fire gases, thus causing injury and toxic exposure to the victim’s lungs. Through the process of normal inhalation and exhalation, the alveoli remove carbon dioxide from the blood and replace it with oxygen to be carried thoughout the body. In their work on smoke inhalation, Keith Lafferty and Harry Goett noted “Inhalation injury from smoke and the noxious products of combustion in fires may account for as many as 60-80% of fire-related deaths in the United States” (Lafftery & Goett, 2010). The body’s natural defense systems fight to protect the injured organs of the respiratory tract. Often fluid accumulation, in the form of swelling of the lungs, further complicates the transfer of oxygen to the already injured alveoli. This process interferes with the victim’s ability to breathe.
The skin is the largest organ of the body and is a primary means of defense from external attack. All three types of heat energy transfer attack the skin’s surface. Depending on the intensity and duration of the exposure, skin may be damaged by: first degree burns which involve only the outer layer of skin and cause pain, redness, and swelling; second degree burns which involve both outer and underlying skin and blistering; third degree burns which extend into the deeper layers of tissues and they additionally present white or blackened skin that may be numb (Penn Medicine, 2010).
While conductive heat energy transfer in a live victim is possible, the duration of extended exposure to a direct flame is rare. In large scale exposures, such as an explosion or ignition of an engulfing fire, the victim may or may not be able to escape before being overcome. On small scale exposures, victims instinctively move their entire body or the exposed portion of the body away from the heat source.
Visible smoke is an airborne accumulation of particulate carbon and other products produced by incomplete combustion. The thickness of the smoke is highly dependent on the fuel being burned, the efficiency of the fire in consuming the fuel, and the ventilation characteristics of the fire compartment. Gann and Bryner (2008), state that “[o]bscuration of vision due to smoke is related to its concentration and is usually expressed as optical density per meter” (p. 6-27). As this optical density increases one’s ability to see clearly decreases. As such, the human eye incrementally loses the ability to clearly identify light signals and the ability to differentiate contrasting colors, such as exit signs and corridors, becomes compromised.
References
Babrauskas, V. (1997). Toxicity for the primary gases found in fires. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://www.doctorfire.com/toxicity.html
Gann, R., & Bryner, N. (2008). Combustion products and their safety effects on life safety. In A. E. Cote, Fire Protection Handbook 20th ed. Section 6. (p. 6.16). Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association.
Helman, R. S., & Habal, R. (2009, September 18). Heat Stroke. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/166320-overview
Lafftery, K., & Goett, H. (2010, June 30). Smoke Inhalation. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/771194-overview
Packaging Today. (n.d.). A Plastics Explosion - Polyethylene, Polypropylene, and Others. Retrieved October 15, 2010, from http://www.packagingtoday.com
Penn Medicine. (2010, January 13). Burns. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from http://www.pennmedicine.org/encyclopedia/em_DisplayArticle.aspx?gcid=000030&ptid=1
Webster's Dictionary. (1996). Webster's Newly Revised Dictionary. Boston New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
CAFS and Line Kinks
To date my department has taken delivery of six pumpers that have integrated Compressed Air Foam Systems. The delivery dates range back several years and not all pumpers were purchased on the same bid. We have two sets of twins (one set is identical the other paternal due to paint scheme) the other two were delivered separately.
Well over a year ago, the decision was made that CAFS would not be used for interior fire attacks. It seems that some of our firefighters and officers had concerns about CAF hose lines. One concern was with the addition of air bubbles in the line, the lines might not withstand the heat encountered during interior firefighting. I guess the logic is that lines filled with water could absorb more BTU’s thus keeping the line from somehow bursting into flame. I have my doubts about this “problem” truly being a problem, but that is not the topic of this posting.
Along with the previously noted concern, firefighters and officer expressed concerns that CAF filled hoselines tend to kink more easily thus decreasing nozzle pressure and the delivery of extinguishing agent. While the scenario may play out to be true, CAF in the line is not the root of the problem.
The root of this problem is poor hoseline management. Compressed Air Foam only showcases the shortcoming. I haven’t been in the department as long as some, but I have plenty of pre-CAFS experience on firegrounds. I remember the calls over the radio for “MORE PRESSURE” from the very beginning of my fire service career. The funny thing is, we didn’t have CAF in the handlines back then.
Hoseline management is a bread-and-butter skill of each firefighter and officer on the job today. The problem we tend to encounter is that every firefighter and most officers want to be as close to the fire and the nozzle as possible; after all it is quiet a rush. So we dump better than half of our pre-connected handlines off our shoulder in the front yard, kick it around until the water fills it, and (hopefully) open the nozzle to bleed and check the pattern. Then begins the game of tug-of-war. Two or three people on the end of a line pulling as hard as possible (all the while protecting the nozzle from those hungry hyenas from the second engine) through the smoke and toward the seat of the fire, until we see the glow. Then we open the 75PSI nozzle only to get about 35PSI. The hungry hyenas are actually the kinks in the hoseline out in the front yard, and looped in the stairwell, double-backed in the hallway. Each eating away at the available pressure until it is reduced beyond effectiveness. Somehow we wiggle, jiggle, and straighten the line enough to knock the fire (hopefully). After a few minutes our relief crew shows up and we stride out into the yard and profess the shortcomings of CAFS because the lines kink too easily.
If we are careful and disciplined in our hoseline management, we avoid all this by flaking out our handline in the yard, spacing ourselves on the hoseline, and working together to avoid double backs and loops. The hoseline should be a straight line from the entry point to the fire room. To achieve this, I have the nozzle person position themselves nearly a full arms length from the nozzle, they can still open the bail of the nozzle but remain in a position to pull. I, as the officer, like to stay back about 5 to 10 feet behind the nozzle person. This gives me the ability to pull line without stumbling over the nozzle person and keep my eyes, ears, and (heat sensors?) on what’s going on ahead of me. The third person I need to stay at or near the point of entry and pull, straighten, pull, straighten, pull, straighten.
Proper hoseline management is critical for good fire suppression. Kinks in a hoseline are evidence of poor hoseline management. Compressed Air Foam in the handline is only a better indicator of that poor hoseline management. I would suggest treating the ailment not the symptoms.
Well over a year ago, the decision was made that CAFS would not be used for interior fire attacks. It seems that some of our firefighters and officers had concerns about CAF hose lines. One concern was with the addition of air bubbles in the line, the lines might not withstand the heat encountered during interior firefighting. I guess the logic is that lines filled with water could absorb more BTU’s thus keeping the line from somehow bursting into flame. I have my doubts about this “problem” truly being a problem, but that is not the topic of this posting.
Along with the previously noted concern, firefighters and officer expressed concerns that CAF filled hoselines tend to kink more easily thus decreasing nozzle pressure and the delivery of extinguishing agent. While the scenario may play out to be true, CAF in the line is not the root of the problem.
The root of this problem is poor hoseline management. Compressed Air Foam only showcases the shortcoming. I haven’t been in the department as long as some, but I have plenty of pre-CAFS experience on firegrounds. I remember the calls over the radio for “MORE PRESSURE” from the very beginning of my fire service career. The funny thing is, we didn’t have CAF in the handlines back then.
Hoseline management is a bread-and-butter skill of each firefighter and officer on the job today. The problem we tend to encounter is that every firefighter and most officers want to be as close to the fire and the nozzle as possible; after all it is quiet a rush. So we dump better than half of our pre-connected handlines off our shoulder in the front yard, kick it around until the water fills it, and (hopefully) open the nozzle to bleed and check the pattern. Then begins the game of tug-of-war. Two or three people on the end of a line pulling as hard as possible (all the while protecting the nozzle from those hungry hyenas from the second engine) through the smoke and toward the seat of the fire, until we see the glow. Then we open the 75PSI nozzle only to get about 35PSI. The hungry hyenas are actually the kinks in the hoseline out in the front yard, and looped in the stairwell, double-backed in the hallway. Each eating away at the available pressure until it is reduced beyond effectiveness. Somehow we wiggle, jiggle, and straighten the line enough to knock the fire (hopefully). After a few minutes our relief crew shows up and we stride out into the yard and profess the shortcomings of CAFS because the lines kink too easily.
If we are careful and disciplined in our hoseline management, we avoid all this by flaking out our handline in the yard, spacing ourselves on the hoseline, and working together to avoid double backs and loops. The hoseline should be a straight line from the entry point to the fire room. To achieve this, I have the nozzle person position themselves nearly a full arms length from the nozzle, they can still open the bail of the nozzle but remain in a position to pull. I, as the officer, like to stay back about 5 to 10 feet behind the nozzle person. This gives me the ability to pull line without stumbling over the nozzle person and keep my eyes, ears, and (heat sensors?) on what’s going on ahead of me. The third person I need to stay at or near the point of entry and pull, straighten, pull, straighten, pull, straighten.
Proper hoseline management is critical for good fire suppression. Kinks in a hoseline are evidence of poor hoseline management. Compressed Air Foam in the handline is only a better indicator of that poor hoseline management. I would suggest treating the ailment not the symptoms.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Sweeping in the Corners
I was watching a program on TV today; the commentary was between two NFL analysts about how some great teams have difficulty maintaining consistently great results. Herm Edwards, the former coach of the perennial powerhouse Indianapolis Colts, threw out a phrase that struck me. He said that great teams that flounder often “forget to sweep in the corners”. I think that statement can often explain the shortcomings for individual shifts, fire stations, and maybe at times entire departments.
If you haven’t figured it out, I’m not talking about sweeping floors; O.K. maybe just a little. The issue I’m addressing in this posting is paying attention to the minute details in our workplace. We are in a business where the adapt-and-overcome mentality usually keeps us from making fools of ourselves. I’ve seen, and participated in, any number of calls where hoselines were incorrectly deployed, pump operators failed miserably, officers set-up apparatus in the wrong place and many other mistakes that come from “not sweeping in the corners”. In each instance, we were able to make it out of the situation through the action a few quick thinking firefighters (or officers). The shame is that any number of our members thinks this is the norm, not the exception.
So how do we avoid such calamities in the future? By “sweeping in the corners”. By that I mean we need to re-educate our members to understand that the little things mean a lot. If one reviews the NIOSH reports of firefighter deaths, you will find that very few of our brethren perish because of a single point failure. Indeed, nearly every fatality is due to numerous small factors or errors that added up to a situation that claimed the life of a brother/sister.
So how do we get where we want to be? We start paying attention to details…and making sure everyone else is sweating the details. When checking our apparatus, each of us should know how everything works, and if you don’t know ASK to be taught. I’ve been to stations where I’ve asked a firefighter how a tool that I’m not familiar with works and gotten the reply that “no one on the shift really knows how that works, it just showed up one day.” Unacceptable. I have heard tales of current apparatus drivers (compensated) not knowing how much supply line their engine carries (no not the reserve). Unacceptable. If you don’t know your apparatus and how everything works on it, you shouldn’t be riding it. If you’ve got more than six months on the floor and you don’t know how it works, you should be disciplined.
I fear that one of the reasons people aren’t being taught mastery of their apparatus is that officers and apparatus drivers (you know the ones that are supposed to be experts) are not familiar with the tools either. Again, unacceptable. If you don’t fully understand how something works you can never master its use. If you don’t know, ask someone. Keep asking until you find that someone that knows how it works and how to maintain it. If you can’t find someone who knows, call Zimm.
Just when you think I’m done rambling, I have a couple of tangents that have not been explored. When is the last time while doing a weekly you pulled everything out of the compartment and swept it out, then wiped it down? If you said you do it every weekly, you’re either an exceptional firefighter or a liar. Be the exceptional firefighter. The reality is that we have plenty of time to do this. Let’s not be in such a hurry to get everything done, let’s take our time and get everything done right and done well. The same goes for the house work. Why are people showing up and hour early and cleaning the toilets before most of the off-going shift is even awake? A lot of recruits have this drilled into their head for some reason. I don’t get it. Is it so we can sit down and be done all the housework at 07:30? Yea, now we have 23.5 hours to kill. This of course doesn’t factor in 10 minutes for apparatus checks and about 20 minutes for an apparatus weekly.
Get out there and take your time, check and clean your equipment/apparatus thoroughly, seek to master every tool at your disposal, ask questions, and last but not least… sweep in the corners.
If you haven’t figured it out, I’m not talking about sweeping floors; O.K. maybe just a little. The issue I’m addressing in this posting is paying attention to the minute details in our workplace. We are in a business where the adapt-and-overcome mentality usually keeps us from making fools of ourselves. I’ve seen, and participated in, any number of calls where hoselines were incorrectly deployed, pump operators failed miserably, officers set-up apparatus in the wrong place and many other mistakes that come from “not sweeping in the corners”. In each instance, we were able to make it out of the situation through the action a few quick thinking firefighters (or officers). The shame is that any number of our members thinks this is the norm, not the exception.
So how do we avoid such calamities in the future? By “sweeping in the corners”. By that I mean we need to re-educate our members to understand that the little things mean a lot. If one reviews the NIOSH reports of firefighter deaths, you will find that very few of our brethren perish because of a single point failure. Indeed, nearly every fatality is due to numerous small factors or errors that added up to a situation that claimed the life of a brother/sister.
So how do we get where we want to be? We start paying attention to details…and making sure everyone else is sweating the details. When checking our apparatus, each of us should know how everything works, and if you don’t know ASK to be taught. I’ve been to stations where I’ve asked a firefighter how a tool that I’m not familiar with works and gotten the reply that “no one on the shift really knows how that works, it just showed up one day.” Unacceptable. I have heard tales of current apparatus drivers (compensated) not knowing how much supply line their engine carries (no not the reserve). Unacceptable. If you don’t know your apparatus and how everything works on it, you shouldn’t be riding it. If you’ve got more than six months on the floor and you don’t know how it works, you should be disciplined.
I fear that one of the reasons people aren’t being taught mastery of their apparatus is that officers and apparatus drivers (you know the ones that are supposed to be experts) are not familiar with the tools either. Again, unacceptable. If you don’t fully understand how something works you can never master its use. If you don’t know, ask someone. Keep asking until you find that someone that knows how it works and how to maintain it. If you can’t find someone who knows, call Zimm.
Just when you think I’m done rambling, I have a couple of tangents that have not been explored. When is the last time while doing a weekly you pulled everything out of the compartment and swept it out, then wiped it down? If you said you do it every weekly, you’re either an exceptional firefighter or a liar. Be the exceptional firefighter. The reality is that we have plenty of time to do this. Let’s not be in such a hurry to get everything done, let’s take our time and get everything done right and done well. The same goes for the house work. Why are people showing up and hour early and cleaning the toilets before most of the off-going shift is even awake? A lot of recruits have this drilled into their head for some reason. I don’t get it. Is it so we can sit down and be done all the housework at 07:30? Yea, now we have 23.5 hours to kill. This of course doesn’t factor in 10 minutes for apparatus checks and about 20 minutes for an apparatus weekly.
Get out there and take your time, check and clean your equipment/apparatus thoroughly, seek to master every tool at your disposal, ask questions, and last but not least… sweep in the corners.
Friday, July 23, 2010
Preconnected Large Flow Lines: Nozzle Selection
As most of you know, I'm a float officer. I get to see a lot of apparatus set ups. Each morning when I report to my daily assignment, I check to see what nozzles each preconnected handline has on it. Usually, I find the 2.5" attack line with the traditional stacked tip smooth-bore nozzle. Given the choice, I think we can do better.
As an officer that has been on a few BIG residential fires (Type V lightweight wood) where the attic is heavily involved prior to our arrival, we need to quickly get upstairs with a RhinoChaser (BigGun), a bunch of brutes with hooks, and singular mission: pull the ceilings and put lots of water on the fire. This is our only hope for success (absent CAFS, but that's a future posting).
With significant attic involvement and a quickly progressing fire, I've found that both the roof sheathing, and some truss chords, fail pretty quickly. What is important about those two facts is that the fire and water stream are no longer contained to a structural compartment.
When aiming the stream of a smooth-bore nozzle into the fire with no structural compartment to deflect off, most of the water shoots straight through the fire, usually landing on the adjacent garage roof, in the back yard, or if you're lucky the firefighters breathing air in the front yard.
It is my opinion that the best nozzle for a preconnected 2.5" attack line is a fog nozzle. When fighting the same conditions as mentioned above you have the option to open the nozzle to a medium to wide pattern and absorb more BTUs, cool (thereby extinguishing) more structural components, and better protect the firefighters working just below the fire from radiant heat.
Some would make the argument that smooth-bore nozzles give a less-broken pattern at further distances. In my completely unscientific testing, I find that the difference at very long distances is negligible. If the decision is made to go to a defensive attack, we can always change to a smooth-bore nozzle on the exterior when the pressure of the firefight is not quite as critical. In my experience, interior structural firefighting is an up-close-and-personal event. Meaning we usually cover distance through hoseline advancement not lobbing a rainbow of water toward the glow.
*Just as a note the majority of fires in Howard County are fought by use of preconnected handlines we very rarely extend or build attack lines.
As an officer that has been on a few BIG residential fires (Type V lightweight wood) where the attic is heavily involved prior to our arrival, we need to quickly get upstairs with a RhinoChaser (BigGun), a bunch of brutes with hooks, and singular mission: pull the ceilings and put lots of water on the fire. This is our only hope for success (absent CAFS, but that's a future posting).
With significant attic involvement and a quickly progressing fire, I've found that both the roof sheathing, and some truss chords, fail pretty quickly. What is important about those two facts is that the fire and water stream are no longer contained to a structural compartment.
When aiming the stream of a smooth-bore nozzle into the fire with no structural compartment to deflect off, most of the water shoots straight through the fire, usually landing on the adjacent garage roof, in the back yard, or if you're lucky the firefighters breathing air in the front yard.
It is my opinion that the best nozzle for a preconnected 2.5" attack line is a fog nozzle. When fighting the same conditions as mentioned above you have the option to open the nozzle to a medium to wide pattern and absorb more BTUs, cool (thereby extinguishing) more structural components, and better protect the firefighters working just below the fire from radiant heat.
Some would make the argument that smooth-bore nozzles give a less-broken pattern at further distances. In my completely unscientific testing, I find that the difference at very long distances is negligible. If the decision is made to go to a defensive attack, we can always change to a smooth-bore nozzle on the exterior when the pressure of the firefight is not quite as critical. In my experience, interior structural firefighting is an up-close-and-personal event. Meaning we usually cover distance through hoseline advancement not lobbing a rainbow of water toward the glow.
*Just as a note the majority of fires in Howard County are fought by use of preconnected handlines we very rarely extend or build attack lines.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Ordinary Construction…when it is and isn’t!!!
Many times I’ve been listening to the radio traffic and heard an officer, both old and new, arrive on location and incorrectly give a size up that classifies the building construction type as Ordinary Construction. The problem we face is a conflict between the word ordinary and the construction type ordinary.
Merriam-Webster.com defines the adjective Ordinary as:
1 : of a kind to be expected in the normal order of events : ROUTINE, USUAL
The following was cut-and-pasted from an article by Chief Vincent Dunne at http://www.workingfire.net/misc7.htm
Ordinary constructed (type III) building is also called a brick-and joist structure. It has masonry-bearing walls but the floors, structural framework and roof are made of wood or other combustible material. Ordinary construction has been described by some firefighters as a "lumberyard enclosed by four brick walls."
Chief Dunne further classifies the construction we most often encounter in residential construction as:
Wood-frame (type V) construction is the most combustible of the five building types. The interior framing and exterior walls may be wood. A wood-frame building is the only one of the five types of construction that has combustible exterior walls. When sizing up a fire in a wood building, the outside walls must be considered for the fire spread. Flames can spread out a window and then along the outside wood walls (in addition to the interior fire spread).
Most of the residential construction in the jurisdiction where I work is not ordinary but (Type V) wood frame. The problem we most often encounter is the conflict between how the rest of the world and the fire service define the word ordinary.
Merriam-Webster.com defines the adjective Ordinary as:
1 : of a kind to be expected in the normal order of events : ROUTINE, USUAL
The following was cut-and-pasted from an article by Chief Vincent Dunne at http://www.workingfire.net/misc7.htm
Ordinary constructed (type III) building is also called a brick-and joist structure. It has masonry-bearing walls but the floors, structural framework and roof are made of wood or other combustible material. Ordinary construction has been described by some firefighters as a "lumberyard enclosed by four brick walls."
Chief Dunne further classifies the construction we most often encounter in residential construction as:
Wood-frame (type V) construction is the most combustible of the five building types. The interior framing and exterior walls may be wood. A wood-frame building is the only one of the five types of construction that has combustible exterior walls. When sizing up a fire in a wood building, the outside walls must be considered for the fire spread. Flames can spread out a window and then along the outside wood walls (in addition to the interior fire spread).
Most of the residential construction in the jurisdiction where I work is not ordinary but (Type V) wood frame. The problem we most often encounter is the conflict between how the rest of the world and the fire service define the word ordinary.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Ladder halyard tie-off
One of the advantages of being a float officer is that in my travels I get to see a lot of different apparatus set ups. Some things that I see are downright ingenious, while others leave me with a sense of wonder. Something along the lines of “I wonder who the idiot was that though that up?".
A recent trend that I have noticed, and feel compelled to speak out against is the tying off of the halyard when stowing ladders in a "slide out" stowage system. It seems that someone is selling (and a lot of people are buying) that the halyard should only be tied off to the rung of the bed section of the ladder. While I understand that such a set up removes one step in throwing of the ladder, thus making for quicker deployment, it also creates a potential on-scene pitfall that far outweighs the benefit (perceived or real).
When you tie off the ladder as described instead of tying off abound both rungs the fly section often slides during transport or when deployed by an overly excited recruit at their first fire. This sliding fly section makes the entire halyard go slack. On several occasions, I have seen halyards become entangled in other ladders, waterway piping, and even bind against its own bed section. The end result is a ladder that is undeployable on the scene. It may even hamper the deployment of other ladders in the stowage compartment. I have personally shoved at no less than three Smots (smallest man on the shift) into the rear compartment of the tower to untangle halyards. The Smots usually don’t come out happy or clean. But we big men all have a good laugh while they’re in there, and even better when they emerge hunched over like some angry troll from beneath a bridge.
Many of us have scratched our heads for hours trying to streamline our operations. However, when trying something new, we need to fully think through the unintended consequence of change.
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